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Abstract: Does the gender of prime ministers and cabinet ministers influence cabinet 
duration? We argue that the risk for early termination of cabinets decreases with women’s 
presence in the executive. As scholars of social psychology indicate, women apply more 
consensual and compromise-oriented conflict resolution strategies. Disputes between or 
within governing parties, which ultimately lead to early termination, should therefore be less 
likely to emerge and escalate if the government is led by a woman or includes numerous 
female members. To test this rationale, we analyse a newly compiled, comprehensive dataset 
covering 676 governments in 27 European countries between 1945 and 2018 by relying on 
event history analysis. The results suggest that cabinets with a higher proportion of female 
cabinet members experience a lower risk of early cabinet termination. This article contributes 
to the study of women as political leaders through additional evidence for the gendered 
nature of leadership styles. 
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1 Introduction 
How do women in the executive influence government stability? Starting with the initial study 
by Lowell (1895), cabinet stability has been well-researched by a comprehensive set of literature 
(see e.g. Laver 1974; Saalfeld 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Warwick 1979). By now, 
scholars have a solid understanding of the effects of contextual, institutional, and party-level 
factors on government survival. However, this set of scholarly work does not take into account 
the transformation of politics in the last decades: While women were mostly absent from politics 
before the 1960s, they occupied 18.5 % of the positions as prime minister and, on average, 30.9 % 
of all government seats in European developed democracies at the end of 2018 (own data).1 This 
development should have led to significant changes in the dynamics behind government survival 
and termination, since female and male political leaders display different behavioural patterns 
(see e.g. Carey et al. 1998; Childs 2000; Eagly and Carli 2004; Norris 1996; Rosener 1990). 
 
We argue that the presence of women in the executive increases cabinet stability. One key risk 
that leads to the dissolution of governments is conflict within the cabinet, either between coalition 
parties or individual ministries (see e.g. Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Krauss 2018). If the 
involved actors follow consensual rather than conflictual strategies, disputes are less likely to 
occur and escalate. How the head of government and the ministers behave as conflicts emerge is 
therefore decisive for government survival. That women are more likely to display a compromise-
oriented and consensual leadership style than men has been revealed in previous research 
(Campus 2013; Eagly 1987; Volden et al. 2013) and is also visible in the day-to-day work of 
cabinets. For instance, different conflict resolution strategies became visible when the Merkel IV 
cabinet – a government well-known for a large number of internal conflicts both between coalition 
partners but also within parties – had to define a new climate protection strategy in 2019 and 
interests of various portfolios clashed. Disputes between the female minister of environment, 
Svenja Schulze (SPD), and the female minister of agriculture, Julia Klöckner (CDU/CSU), were 
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solved through direct communication and focused on the substance of the problem. By contrast, 
the male minister of transport, Andreas Scheuer (CDU/CSU), attacked the environmental 
minister on a personal level and through the media. Scheuer publicly claimed that Schulze 
intentionally achieved poor results for Germany at EU-level negotiations to get her interests 
through, referenced her policy proposals to communism, and limited scope for compromise by 
claiming his party would never support initiatives similar to the ones Schulze put forward 
(Kersting and Murphy 2019; Krämer 2018; Preker 2020; Welt 2019). Based on these observations, 
we propose that women’s presence as ministers and prime ministers decreases the risk for early 
dissolution. 
 
Our study provides empirical evidence for the link between cabinet duration and the gender 
compositions of cabinets based on original data for 676 governments in 27 European democracies. 
Covering the whole period after the Second World War, it is the most comprehensive dataset on 
women in governments to date. By exploiting the longitudinal and cross-sectional variation of the 
data, the analyses are able to disentangle the time trends towards enhanced cabinet stability and 
women’s increasing presence in the executive. The findings reveal that the risk of early 
government termination is substantially lower for cabinets with a higher share of female cabinet 
members. In contrast to this substantial effect, the risk-reducing effect of having a female prime 
minister on the duration of governments does not reach conventional levels of statistical 
significance. 
 
This article provides a comprehensive theoretical framework and an empirical analysis of the link 
between women in politics and cabinet stability. The main argument links women in politics 
directly to the mechanisms explaining government termination through the gendered nature of 
leadership styles. Thereby, the present research contributes to studies on cabinet stability by 
introducing the individual characteristics of the members of the executive as a new explanatory 
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factor beyond events, institutions, and rational choices of coalition parties. Additionally, we 
enrich the small but growing set of studies comparing the behaviour of male and female political 
leaders. This literature has not yet reached any conclusive evidence as to whether women in high-
profile executive offices display the same feminine leadership style apparent in the behaviour of 
parliamentarians (Carey et al. 1998; Childs 2000, 2004; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 
2016; Genovese and Steckenrider 2013; Volden et al. 2013). The evidence presented in this article 
supports the idea of a distinctly feminine leadership style of ministers, characterized by 
compromise- and consensus-orientation. 
 
2 The role of gender in explaining cabinet stability 
Given the importance of cabinet stability for the performance of the political system, a 
comprehensive set of literature aims to explain the survival and termination of governments. 
These studies can be summarised along three traditions: Firstly, game-theoretic research explains 
cabinet stability as a consequence of the rational choices of coalition parties (Diermeier and 
Stevenson 1999; Lupia and Strøm 1995). Secondly, critical events such as scandals, crises, or 
international conflicts have been highlighted as determinants of government survival (Browne et 
al. 1984; Frendreis et al. 1986). Thirdly, the ‘attributes’ approach reveals how a broad variety of 
cabinet characteristics affect their likelihood of lasting. The institutional setting within which a 
government operates can influence cabinet stability. The power of the head of state (Strøm and 
Swindle 2002) or the Prime Minister (Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009) to dissolve parliament is 
particularly relevant. The party composition of governments is a second attribute explaining 
survival. Having a majority in parliament (see e.g. Saalfeld 2008), being a minimal winning 
cabinet (see e.g. Laver 1974; Saalfeld 2008), and having ideological compactness within the 
government (see e.g. Saalfeld 2008; Warwick 1979), all have positive effects on cabinet stability. 
 
The three sets of literature agree that conflicts within the government constitute a key explanation 
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for government termination. Once in office, policy-seeking actors will have disputes about 
concrete policy decisions. Dissent might emerge between coalition partners or ministers from the 
same party. If conflicts cannot be settled, coalition governments might break apart or parliaments 
might dissolve single-and multi-party governments to avoid deadlocks (Diermeier and Stevenson 
1999). We argue that the likelihood for disputes to emerge, escalate, and lead to government 
dissolution, also depends on the leadership styles of the politicians in cabinet. The presence of a 
head of government and ministers who adopt consensual and compromise-oriented – as opposed 
to hierarchical and confrontational – strategies, reduces the risk for internal conflicts. This, in turn, 
increases the odds of government survival. Since women’s leadership style tends to be 
characterised by higher levels of collaboration than men’s, we hypothesise that the presence of a 
female prime minister and female ministers positively impacts cabinet stability.2  
 
Women favour solving dissent and conflict through collaborative and compromise-oriented 
strategies, while men tend to opt for hierarchical and confrontational plans of action (Kellerman 
et al. 2007; March and Weil 2005; Norris 1996). Women’s leadership style has also been described 
as “democratic and consensual” (Campus 2013, p.16), highlighting the fact that they make use of 
interpersonal ties to find acceptable solutions for all actors involved through persuasion. Two 
main explanations for these gender differences in leadership style stand side by side: On the one 
hand, social role theory proposes that individuals adapt to societal expectations about appropriate 
behaviour, which are shaped by traditional role models, and these norms impede women from 
following more aggressive conflict resolution strategies (Eagly 1987). On the other hand, women 
might develop distinct behavioural patterns to overcome added barriers to success in politics, 
which involve supporting and collaborating with other actors (Volden et al. 2013).  
 
Three sets of literature lend support to the argument that women are more consensus- and 
compromise-oriented than men: To begin with, research on women in top management positions 
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shows that female leaders aim to encourage participation in decision-making procedures, and 
tend to share power, while their male colleagues more frequently engage in top-down decisions 
(Eagly 2007; Rosener 1990). More effective communication skills are a key tool enabling women 
to successfully implement such strategies (Stanford et al. 1995, p.15). In the field of international 
relations, scholars interested in explaining conflicts and their intensity reveal that wars and 
violence occur less frequently under female leadership (see e.g. Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Maoz 
2012). Known as the ‘women and peace` hypothesis (Tessler et al. 1999), this second set of 
literature indicates that women are less belligerent than their male colleagues, are more willing to 
share resources and take other’s preferences into account – even if this implies not being able to 
maximize their personal gains. Lastly, scholars of legislative behaviour revealed gender 
differences between male and female parliamentarians: Women tend to apply democratic and 
consensual strategies; they invest more time and effort into creating within- and across-party 
coalitions (Carey et al. 1998; Volden et al. 2013). When asked about their leadership style, female 
legislators stress their dedication to settling disputes by concessions on each side (Childs 2000, 
2004). Overall, there are various cues that women are more compromise-oriented than men. 
 
Because leadership styles are gendered in nature, we deduce that the presence of female prime 
ministers decreases the risk of government termination as a consequence of conflict within the 
cabinet. Since government members have to reach shared decisions, the intra-group dynamic is 
decisive for successful decision-making (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993, p.1). The head of 
government has a leading function within the group and can help to maintain constructive inter-
personal relations between cabinet members. A woman as prime minister will invest more effort 
in proactively integrating all relevant actors into decisions than male office-holders, which 
reduces the probability that major conflicts occur. If disputes between ministers emerge, female 
heads of government are better equipped to act as mediators, and support those involved in 
finding acceptable compromises. If the prime minister is part of the conflict, a woman tends to 
7 
prefer dispute settlement through consensual decisions instead of escalating the situation with 
top-down rulings. Overall, the tendency of female heads of government to engage in this 
compromise-oriented behaviour provides them with a strong tool to reduce the risk of conflict 
within the executive. Men as heads of government, in turn, have a higher propensity to let 
conflicts escalate and are not as well prepared to settle them. We thus hypothesize the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
The risk of early government termination is lower if the head of government is a woman instead of a man. 
 
Secondly, higher proportions of women in the executive can also enhance government stability 
by reducing the risk of intra-cabinet conflicts. If government members hold opposing positions, 
female ministers are more likely to actively search for compromise and make concessions, while 
male ministers should, according to the theory, prefer to push through their preferred outcome. 
Logically, every additional cabinet seat for a woman should, then, increase the overall degree of 
consensus-orientation within the executive and enhance government stability. Kanter (1977) 
originally introduced the argument that growing numbers of women lead to changes in 
organizational cultures (see also Dahlerup 1988). She argued that women tend to adapt to the 
behaviour of the dominant majority culture as long as their share within a group remains 
marginal. Their distinctiveness only becomes visible as their numerical strength increases. A 
comprehensive set of literature shows that women’s visibility as tokens indeed decreases gender 
differences in leadership style (Nicolaou-Smokoviti and Baldwin 2000; Oshagbemi and Gill 2003). 
The more women are present in the executive, the more likely it is that they will show their distinct 
behaviour and utilise their compromise-oriented leadership style. 
 
Notably, this rationale differs from the logic introduced in a recent study of the effect of female 
ministers on cabinet stability in thirteen European countries by Martin (2018). The author draws 
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on group polarization theory (see e.g. Brauer and Judd 1996; Brown 2000) to construct the 
argument that governments with more female members reach better policy decisions, which 
enables them to last longer. While this argument is intriguing, the relationship between the 
quality of government and early cabinet termination is subject to many confounding factors. We 
propose a direct link connecting the conflict resolution strategies of female ministers to the 
propensity that disputes within the government emerge as one of the main threats to cabinet 
stability. The argument developed in this study, hence, builds closely on previous literature 
studying cabinet duration. Nevertheless, like Martin (2018), we expect to find a positive 
relationship between the proportion of women in governments and their stability. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
The higher the share of female cabinet members, the lower the risk of early government termination. 
 
In general, the logic applied in developing these two hypotheses might be extended to other actors 
involved in the government dissolution process, such as parliaments or presidents in semi-
presidential systems. We decided to restrict our analyses to the members of the executive because 
of their central role for cabinet stability. Most importantly, cabinets can decide to step down 
without calling early elections, thereby giving other parties the possibility to form a new 
government. Moreover, previous research has shown that the powers of the head of government, 
such as the right to dissolve parliament, are powerful determinants of cabinet stability (Strøm and 
Swindle 2002).3 
 
3 Research design 
 
Our dataset encompasses 676 governments from 27 countries between 1945 and 2018.4 We relied 
on the country coverage provided by the ERDDA dataset (Andersson et al. 2014), which is also 
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used in other studies on cabinet stability, and extended its time frame until the year 2018. By 
including a large number of countries, we increase the external validity of our sample. Countries 
differ with regard to important institutional characteristics that relate to cabinet stability and 
women’s presence in the executive, for instance the electoral system, the existence of an 
investiture vote, and democratic experience. Additionally, we study single-party as well as 
coalition cabinets since our theoretical argument relies on attributes of those who govern rather 
than an interaction between parties in government. 
 
3.1 Dependent variable: Cabinet duration 
 
Our dependent variable is cabinet duration. We operationalize it as the absolute duration of a 
government in days and control for the length of the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP) in 
the analyses.5 The variable is constructed by subtracting the cabinet start date from the cabinet 
end date. To distinguish between different ways of ending a cabinet, we create a variable that 
records the type of termination: conflictual, technical6 as well as voluntary early elections7. We 
rely on data provided by the CPD (Müller and Strøm 2008) for the Western European countries 
until 1999, on the data on coalition governments in Western and Eastern Europe until 2015 by 
Krauss (2018) and coded the missing cabinets ourselves by relying on on- and offline records for 
the governments. In the main analysis, we display the models for conflictual terminations.  
 
3.2 Explanatory variables: Women as prime ministers and ministers 
 
We constructed two explanatory variables: the gender of the head of government and the share 
of women in a given cabinet. The gender of the head of government (HoG) is operationalised as 
a dichotomous variable: it is coded 0 if the office is held by a man and is coded 1 if the office is 
held by a woman. The share of women in cabinet variable measures the number of female 
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government members as a percentage of all appointments in a given government. We take all 
members of cabinet into account, independent of their status as original, replacement, or interim 
member, and their position within the cabinet. Hence, for most countries, we count the prime 
minister/head of executive and the deputy prime minister(s) as well as all ministers with and 
without portfolio as members of the executive. The British case is an exemption, since a broader 
variety of high-level executives regularly attend cabinet meetings (e.g. Secretaries of State, the 
Leaders of the houses) and, as such, are included in our measure. If the same person holds several 
positions in a cabinet (at the same time or over time), we only count him or her once. This inclusive 
approach follows the rationale that all people directly involved in government decisions are 
decisive for cabinet survival. 
 
To identify the gender of ministers and prime ministers, we gathered a full list of all cabinet 
members serving in democratic governments since 1945.8 We hand-coded the gender of all 
ministers individually based on (1) language skills (if the coder knew that a first name or the 
ending of a last name is clearly associated with a sex) (28.9% of all ministers), (2) information 
provided by the political data yearbook European Journal of Political Research (1992-2002) (6.8%), 
and (3) texts and photos on government websites and in media reports (64.3%).  
 
Looking at the distribution of these two variables, we find very few female prime ministers: only 
4.44% of our cabinets are led by a woman. The first woman to serve as head of government in our 
sample was Thatcher in 1979. Of all 27 countries, 15 never had a female prime minister. 
 
The share of women in government varies between 0% and 54.5% with a mean of 13.4% in our 
sample. Figure 1 presents box plots per decade and reveals a clear time trend. The median share 
of women in government increased from zero in the 1940s and 1950s, to 28.6% after 2010. The 
largest increases in women’s presence in governments occurred in the last two decades. While 
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women’s numerical strength in Scandinavian cabinets characterized them as outliers in the early 
decades, the share of women in government in these countries lies within the whiskers now.  
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
3.3 Control variables 
 
We also control for a number of additional variables that potentially influence the stability of 
cabinets. First, we take temporal aspects into account by including the maximum possible cabinet 
duration and the length of the constitutional inter-election period (CIEP). The time left in the 
legislative term from the moment a government is formed varies depending on whether the 
government formed right after the election or came into office during the legislative term after 
another government failed. The amount of time that potential parties required to negotiate 
coalitions matter as well. Following the reasoning by Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) and 
Saalfeld (2008), we assume that the lower the opportunity costs of terminating a cabinet early, the 
closer the next regularly scheduled election will be. This means that the risk of government 
termination should be higher if the maximum possible cabinet duration is short. The variable was 
constructed by subtracting the date of cabinet formation from the date of the next scheduled 
election and is measured in days. For cabinets that formed before 2012, we relied on the data 
provided by the ERDDA dataset (Andersson et al. 2014). For governments that entered office after 
2012, we calculated the maximum possible cabinet duration ourselves by relying on data from the 
ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2019). Additionally, cabinet duration as the absolute 
number of days requires controlling for the length of the legislative term (Browne and Gleiber 
1986). The data was collected by relying on on- and offline information about the electoral systems 
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in the countries under observation. 
 
We further take differences between the cabinets in our sample into account. The variable 
‘ideological divisiveness’ controls for potential for conflict within the government. On the one 
hand, this variable captures the likelihood that conflicts emerge in single-party compared to 
coalition governments. Intra-party conflicts might lead to early termination of single-party 
governments made up of only one party. On the other hand, the variable indicates the potential 
for tensions that emerge within coalition governments as a consequence of ideological differences. 
Diverging preferences of the governing parties are an additional threat to cabinet stability in 
coalition governments. Previous research has shown that instability of coalition cabinets is 
associated with higher ideological divisiveness among the parties forming the coalition (see e.g. 
Saalfeld 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009). The variable is operationalised as the difference 
between the most extreme parties in a coalition, on the left-right continuum, and takes the value 
’0’ for single-party cabinets. The data originates from the Manifesto Project (Budge et al. 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2018). We also include the minority status of a cabinet to 
capture the strength of the executive vis-a-vis the legislature. Per definitionem, minority 
governments do not have the support of a majority of representatives and are, therefore, more 
vulnerable to either a defeat in parliament, or to votes of no confidence (Saalfeld 2008; Strøm and 
Swindle 2002). Accordingly, we expect that the risk of early government termination is higher if 
the cabinet is a minority government. Minority status is a dichotomous variable, coded ’1’ if the 
government does not command a majority in the legislature and ’0’ otherwise. We relied on data 
provided by ParlGov to operationalise this variable (Döring and Manow 2019). 
 
Lastly, we capture systematic differences between the parliaments. The effective number of 
parliamentary parties is included, as it signals both the number of outside options for the 
government parties as well as the complexity of the bargaining environment in general (Saalfeld 
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2008, p. 346). The risk of early cabinet termination should increase with a higher effective number 
of parliamentary parties. The data for this variable was also taken from the ParlGov database 
(Döring and Manow 2019).9 
 
 
4 Empirical evidence for women’s risk-reducing effect on early government termination 
 
In this section, we test our theoretical expectations by relying on event history analysis. In 
comparison to normal regression analysis, this modelling strategy is able to handle censored data 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Censoring in the case of cabinet duration means that a cabinet 
is treated as if it were still in office if it terminated due to technical reasons such as the end of the 
legislative term. We use Cox Proportional Hazards models as we do not have any theoretical 
expectations with regard to the shape of the hazard rate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The 
model, however, assumes that the hazards are proportional in the sense that they do not vary 
over time for different observations (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). If this assumption is 
violated, significance tests and coefficients might be biased (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001). In 
our case, the length of the CIEP as well as ideological divisiveness violate this assumption in most 
models. In order to overcome this problem, we interact these two variables with the natural 
logarithm of time as suggested by Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001). Since our observations are 
clustered into countries, we run shared frailty models. This approach is similar to a fixed-effects 
regression and accounts for the fact that governments within countries might share many 
characteristics that increase the risk of early termination.  
 
Table 1 displays the results of our analyses. The coefficients displayed are hazard ratios. Values 
below one signal a risk-reducing effect of the variable on early government termination due to 




[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Our first hypothesis states that the risk of early government termination is lower if the head of 
government is a woman. Model 1 in Table 1 includes the results of the analysis for the effect of 
the gender of the head of government. The hazard ratio for this variable is below one but not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. While the heads of government are usually seen as 
the most important individuals in a cabinet, the effect of their gender does not seem to be strong 
enough to significantly reduce the risk of early government termination. A large standard error 
indicates substantial variation in the length of women-led governments, ranging from very short 
terms such as thirty days by Suchocka II in Poland or 62 days by Jäätteenmäki in Finland, to long-
lasting governments like those led by Merkel in Germany or Brundtland in Norway. One potential 
explanation for this pattern might be that the effect of gender on the leadership style of prime 
ministers might not be as consistent as we originally expected. Another explanation could be that 
female party leaders tend to be elected into office during difficult times, as previous research has 
shown (O’Brien 2015). This, in turn, could influence the risk of early government termination and 
explain the inconclusive findings. 
 
In Model 2 in Table 1, we test whether the share of women in the cabinet influences cabinet 
stability. Similar to the first analysis, the hazard ratio is below one and indicates a risk-reducing 
effect of women’s presence in cabinets on conflictual cabinet termination. In contrast to the first 
analysis, however, this effect is statistically significant at the 1%-level. Figure 2 further illustrates 
the analysed relationship. The figure illustrates the survival hazards for cabinets with the 
minimum share of women in cabinet (0, solid line), the mean share of women in cabinet (13.5, 
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dashed line) and the maximum share of women in cabinet (54.6, dotted line). The x-axis shows 
the number of days since government formation whereas the y-axis displays the percentage of 
cabinets that have not yet been terminated. After a duration of 1000 days, the share of 
governments that survive up until this point is at around 45% if there are no female ministers, 
and at around 80% when the share of women in the cabinet is at a maximum, as in the case of 
Finland under Katainen I and Sweden under Reinfeldt II. Overall, this evidence provides solid 
support for the second hypothesis, namely that the risk of early cabinet termination decreases 
with women’s presence in the executive. 
 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
With regard to our control variables, we only find a coherent influence in both models for 
maximum possible cabinet duration, minority status, and ideological divisiveness. Consistent 
with our theoretical expectations, maximum possible cabinet duration decreases the risk of early 
government termination while minority status and the ideological divisiveness of a cabinet have 
a risk-increasing influence. 
 
We have further tested the robustness of our findings by including seven additional model 
specifications. In a first series of robustness tests, we added a series of variables to test for omitted 
variable bias and endogeneity concerns. To begin with, we use inflation, growth, and 
unemployment as proxy variables for the quality of policy outcomes created by a cabinet. It is 
possible that cabinets with larger shares of female ministers are more durable because they make 
better policy decisions (Martin 2018). The variables are operationalised by subtracting the scores 
for inflation, growth and unemployment in the year the government was formed from the scores 
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of the year in which the government was terminated. These variables originate from the ERDDA 
dataset (Andersson et al. 2014). Second, we include decade dummies to control for time-effects. 
Over time, cabinets have become more stable (see e.g. Saalfeld 2008) and the representation of 
women has increased (see e.g. Hughes and Paxton 2019). Our findings could, therefore, be 
explained by a simultaneous increase in both cabinet duration and women’s representation. 
Third, we also tested for the effect of a dummy variable that indicates whether a country belongs 
to Central or Eastern Europe (CEE). Previous research has shown that cabinet stability (Krauss 
2018; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009) and the representation of women (Hughes and Paxton 
2019) are particularly low in these regions. Fourth, we include a dummy variable for Scandinavian 
countries since these countries traditionally display a more compromise-oriented political culture 
(see e.g. Green-Pedersen and Thomsen 2011) and have a higher rate of female participation in 
politics (Hughes and Paxton 2019). Fifth, we control for the ideology of the parliament since 
scholarly work on women in politics indicate that leftist parties tend to send more women to the 
legislature and the executive (Claveria 2014; Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005). As a 
final test in this series, we also examine whether or not the median party in parliament is part of 
the government since this might increase cabinet duration (Saalfeld 2008). For all robustness 
checks, the results of our main explanatory variables remain substantially the same and do not 
shed doubts on the finding that the share of women in a given cabinet and its stability are 
systematically linked (see Table A.2 to A.7 in the Appendix). 
 
In addition, we test whether our linear measure for the share of women in cabinet captures the 
effect appropriately. The literature engaging with women in organizations suggests that the effect 
of the share of women in government changes at certain cut-off points rather than unfolding in a 
linear manner (Dahlerup 1988; Kanter 1977). We test for non-linearity by including a nominal 
measure for the share of women in cabinet. The variable includes four categories: less than 5%, 
5%-15%, 15%-30%, and more than 30% female cabinet members. The results can be found in Table 
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A.8. The findings indicate that the change in the coefficients from one category to the next mirrors 
the linear model. Hazard ratios decrease as the share of women within the category increases.  
 
Finally, we ran a competing risks approach in which we distinguish between conflictual 
terminations, the pooled sample, as well as replacements and dissolutions. Replacements are 
those terminations that end with a new government being formed without new elections whereas 
dissolutions include those terminations that end in early elections (Diermeier and Stevenson 
1999). Diermeier and Stevenson (1999) argue that these types of cabinet termination are inherently 
different since early elections reset the clock and completely change the balance of power in the 
parliament. The results of the competing risks approach can be found in tables A.9 and A.10. Our 





In this article we have analysed the influence the gender of the political actors in the executive has 
on cabinet stability. We have argued that female prime ministers and cabinet members display a 
distinct leadership style that reduces the risk of early cabinet termination due to internal conflicts. 
We used original data for women in governments covering 27 European countries between 1945 
and 2018 to underpin our arguments. The empirical analyses reveal that the risk of early cabinet 
termination decreases with higher proportions of female cabinet members. The duration of 
governments led by a woman, in turn, varies considerably, even though it is, on average, longer 
than the duration of governments led by a man. Therefore, our analyses indicate that women’s 
increasing presence in politics increases government stability overall.  
 
These insights contribute to the literature on government duration by introducing the individual-
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level characteristics of the involved actors as explanatory variables. Previous literature has 
examined how party strategies (Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Lupia and Strøm 1995), critical 
events (Brown  et al. 1984; Frendreis et al. 1986), and the institutional set-up of the government 
and parliament (Krauss 2018; Saalfeld 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Strøm and Swindle 
2002; Timmermans and Moury 2006) affects government duration. We contribute to these 
explanations by showing that the behaviour of government members, which varies according to 
gender, also matters. Taking individual-level variables into account in future research can 
contribute to a better understanding of why governments last or terminate. Other characteristics 
of a prime minister and ministers that determine their leadership style might be differences in 
political professionalization, educational attainment, or age.  
 
Moreover, this study enriches the small but growing set of research interested in how women 
make politics. Our findings suggest that female ministers are able to introduce different 
behavioural norms and change the nature of politics towards a more compromise-oriented 
setting. Beyond the outbreak of violent conflicts (see e.g. Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Maoz 2012; 
Tessler et al. 1999) and legislative behaviour (see e.g. Carey et al. 1998; Childs 2000, 2004; Volden 
et al. 2013), cabinet stability is another political phenomenon where the gender of the involved 
actors has a significant impact. To further enhance our understanding of women’s role for 
government survival, future research could take different sets of actors, and their specific role in 
explaining cabinet stability, into account. For instance, the share of women in the legislature might 
influence the risk for government termination as a consequence of dissolution of parliament. Since 
women tend to be risk averse (see Ertac and Gurdal 2012; Nelson 2015) and might value the 
security of having a mandate and a certain party strength in the status quo, female legislators 
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Notes 
1. Figures include all EU member countries plus Iceland and Norway except for Croatia, Malta, 
and Cyprus. 
2. We assume that women’s presence in cabinets is endogenous to the degree of compromise-
orientation in the executive. While women tend to have lower political ambition (Lawless and 
Fox 2013) and a higher aversion to competitive environments than men (Preece and Stoddard 
2015), these patterns are less likely to persist for the highest political positions. Previous 
research indicates that, when it comes to posts in the executive, women’s presence is mostly 
limited by institutional barriers and biased selection criteria of party gate keepers (see e,g, 
Barnes and Taylor-Robinson 2018). 




4. The countries are the following: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. 
5. This measurement approach allows for running a survival analysis, which is the established 
method in cabinet stability research. 
6. All terminations that are non-discretionary such as termination due to the end of the 
legislative term. 
7. In some countries, such as Denmark, cabinets sometimes call for voluntary early elections 
because they want additional approval for major policy reforms. 
8. For that purpose, we made use of the website http://www.kolumbus.fi/taglarsson/. 
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Figure 2: Effect of the share of women in the cabinet on cabinet duration 
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Table 1: Gender and stability 







 (0.290) \ 
Share women (cabinet) \ 0.982*** 
 \ (0.005) 
Control variables   
Max. poss. cabinet duration 0.999*** 0.999*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Length of CIEP 0.296 0.319 
 (0.262) (0.282) 
Ideological divisiveness 0.972 0.974 
 (0.018) (0.018) 
Minority status 1.751*** 1.715*** 
 (0.277) (0.270) 
Effective number of parl. parties 1.074 1.122** 
 (0.057) (0.058) 
Time-variant coefficients 











Observations 676 676 
Number of failures 284 284 
Log likelihood -1613.278 -1607.606 
With ***p ≤ 0.01, **p ≤ 0.05, *p ≤ 0.10; standard errors in 
parentheses; coefficients displayed are hazard ratios; 
rounded hazard ratios of 1.000 have been rounded up 
to 1.001 or rounded down to 0.999 to signal the 
direction. 
